Right now when a client connects to a hidden server, both parties pick a "rendezvous point" and create anonymous connections to it, so that neither side knows the others identity. The identity of tor2web proxies, however, are public, so there is no point in disguising their identity.
If Tor had an option to allow the tor2web proxies to select themselves as rendezvous points, it could significantly speed things up.
STATUS: Roger says he's hesitant to support this.
Support more things like NLnet Project: Speed Up Tor Hidden Services.
It would be great if
nginx (the caching proxy we use with
tor2web) support Tor (i.e. SOCKS4a) so that we didn't have to proxy requests through
privoxy as well.
It would be nice if there was a Tor browser bundle that only handled .onion requests so that people could visit .onion websites without routing all of their traffic through Tor.
tor2web proxies frequently go down, but this is difficult to detect because of the long and variable lags in returning uncached pages as well as frequent downtime from even the most popular network services. Reliable tools to detect whether a proxy is actually down, notify its owner, and remove it from the DNS round robbin would be an enormous help.
There are multiple caching proxies that server
*.tor2web.org requests. If users are directed to select one at random, this leads to cache fragmentation. Ideally, the DNS server would use a consistent hashing scheme to return a particular server for each onion domain.